

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 16946 062138Z

67

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-04 ISO-00 SAM-01 SAJ-01 OES-02 ACDA-05 EB-04

FPC-01 FEA-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-01 INR-05 L-01

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 /073 W

----- 011875

R 061611Z NOV 74

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4383

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMASSY BONN

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 16946

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, GW, UR, WB

SUBJ: MORE ON GENSCHER-GROMYKO TALKS ON BERLIN

REF: A. MOSCOW 16569

B. MOSCOW 16650

C. BONN 17106

1. SUMMARY:

AT QUADRIpartite MEETING NOVEMBER 6 FRG AMBASSADOR

SAHM PROVIDED US FURTHER INFORMATION (REFTELS)

ON THE BERLIN ASPECTS OF THE GENSCHER-GROMYKO TALKS DURING

THE SCHMIDT VISIT. THE FRG SIDE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS

THAT THEY COULD NOT PLAY OFF SCHMIDT AGAINST GENSCHER ON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 16946 062138Z

BERLIN AND OTHER ISSUES, AND SAHM DENIED FRG PRESS

REPORTS THAT THERE WERE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHANCELLOR AND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER. IN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' TALKS BEFORE THE BERLIN COMPROMISE OF OCTOBER 30, GROMYKO TOOK A TOUGH ATTITUDE ON BERLIN AND THE GERMANS RESPONDED IN KIND. END SUMMARY.

2. GROMYKO TOLD GENSCHER THAT, IF THE FRG TRIES TO INCLUDE WEST BERLIN IN ITS "SYSTEM," THEN THE SOVIETS HAVE SUFFICIENT POSSIBILITIES OF RECOURSE, INCLUDING "GEOGRAPHICAL POSSIBILITIES." BUT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT WANT A SHARPENING OF THE SITUATION; EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. GROMYKO WARNED THAT THE USSR SHOULD NOT BE PUT IN A POSITION WHICH PERMITS IT ONLY ONE COURSE OF ACTION. THE FRG REFERENCES TO THE THREE POWERS MAKE NO IMPRESSION ON THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. THE USSR KNOWS ITSELF WHAT IS LEGITIMATE AND RIGHT. IT IS A FULL PARTNER IN THE QA AND ANYTHING DONE WITHOUT ITS CONSENT IS OF NO IMPORTANCE. THE INTERPRETATIONS OF OTHERS ARE OF NO IMPORTANCE; ONLY JOINT ACTIONS HAVE SIGNIFICANCE.

3. GENSCHER'S REPLY WAS THAT IT IS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE FRG TO MOVE THE USSR FROM ITS PRINCIPLED POSITIONS BUT RATHER TO FIND A SOLUTION TO PRACTICAL QUESTIONS. THE BROAD OPINIONS OF BOTH SIDES ON THE BASIC QUESTIONS ARE WELL KNOWN. FOR THE FRG THE LEGAL OPINION OF THE THREE POWERS WHO HAVE AUTHORITY ON WEST BERLIN IS OF THE UTMOST IMPORTANCE. IT IS NOT UP TO THE FRG HOW OR WHETHER THE FOUR POWERS DIFFER IN INTERPRETING THE QA. THE MAIN FRG HOPE IS THAT THE FOUR POWERS AGREE. GENSCHER SAID THAT THE FRG HAS NO INTENTION OF INCLUDING WEST BERLIN IN ITS "SYSTEM" BUT DOES ADHERE TO THE POSSIBILITIES WHICH THE QA OFFERS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF TIES WITH WEST BERLIN. THE FRG IS WELL AWARE OF THE "GEOGRAPHICAL POSSIBILITIES" REFERRED TO BY GROMYKO. THE FRG IS TRYING TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH THE USSR POSITIVELY AND DOES NOT WANT TO SHARPEN THE SITUATION. THE FRG EXPECTS THE USSR AND THE GDR TO RESPECT THE SPIRIT AND LETTER OF THE QA.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 16946 062138Z

4. ACCORDING TO SAHM, THE FRG SIDE GAVE THE SOVIETS AMPLE SIGNALS THAT THEY WOULD NOT BEND ON BERLIN. BY TALKING LOUDLY IN A MEETING AMONG THEMSELVES IN A ROOM THEY KNEW WAS BUGGED, THE GERMANS GOT IT ACROSS TO THE SOVIETS THAT, IF THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT IN BERLIN, THERE WOULD BE NO SCHMIDT VISIT TO KIEV AND THE COMMUNIQUE WOULD BE SHORTENED FROM 16 PAGES TO 6. MOREOVER, TO

MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY HAD NO HOPE OF INFLUENCING SCHMIDT IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, SAHM WAS DELEGATED TO INFORM THE SOVIET SIDE AT ONE POINT (PRESUMABLY THE EVENING OF OCTOBER 29) THAT GENSCHER SHOULD ATTEND THE NEXT DAY'S SCHMIDT-BREZHNEV MEETING. FINALLY, THE GERMANS CONTENDED THROUGHOUT THE VISIT THAT THERE COULD BE NO PROGRESS ON THE OVERALL BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT PROGRESS ON BERLIN.

5. IN COMMENTING ON THE NUCLEAR POWER PLANT, SAHM SAID THAT THE GERMANS ARE PARTICULARLY PLEASED AT THE SOVIET AGREEMENT THAT POWER COULD FLOW IN EITHER DIRECTION BETWEEN THE FRG AND WEST BERLIN. THE FRG REGARDS THIS AS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE CONCESSIONS THE SOVIETS MADE ON THE EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS BECAUSE IT IS A SIGN THAT THE SOVIETS WILL HONOR FRG INTERESTS IN WEST BERLIN.

STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AMITY, MINISTERIAL VISITS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 06 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: KelleyW0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974MOSCOW16946
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D740319-0845
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741166/aaaaceis.tel
Line Count: 133
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: A. MOSCOW 16569
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: KelleyW0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 MAY 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 MAY 2002 by rowelle0>; APPROVED <27 MAR 2003 by KelleyW0>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MORE ON GENSCHER-GROMYKO TALKS ON BERLIN
TAGS: PFOR, GE, UR, WB, (SCHMIDT)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005